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Abstract: Many believe that the welfare state undermines productivity, economic growth and 
development; that the United States has an unusually small welfare state; and finally that the 
United States is and always has been a welfare state laggard. This paper shows that all three 
propositions are false when one includes education along with cash benefits and health care 
support as part of the welfare state. We argue that the social programs that constitute the welfare 
state complement capitalism and enrich nations. The American welfare state is not unusually 
small, but, it is peculiar in its reliance upon the combination of employer-provided benefits and 
weak cash benefit programs for the poor. Finally, the United States rather than always being a 
laggard in welfare state development was a leader in the provision of public education for most 







Irwin (Irv) Garfinkel is Mitchell I. Ginsberg Professor of Contemporary Urban Problems at the 
Columbia University School of Social Work and co-director of the Columbia Population 
Research Center.  
 
Timothy Smeeding is director of the Institute for Research on Poverty and Arts and Sciences 
Distinguished Professor of Public Affairs at the La Follette School of Public Affairs and 
Economics at the University of Wisconsin–Madison, and founder and director emeritus of the 
Luxembourg Income Study 
1 
“Wealth and Welfare States: What Is the Real Story?” 
 
 Many believe the following three statements to be true. The welfare state undermines 
productivity and economic growth. The United States has an unusually small welfare state. And, 
the United States is and always has been a welfare state laggard. This paper is based largely on 
our book entitled Wealth and Welfare States: Is America A Laggard or Leader?  (Garfinkel 
Rainwater and Smeeding 2010) with some updated for recent events. The paper shows that all 
three propositions are false. All rich nations, including the United States, have large welfare 
states because the socialized programs that constitute the welfare state—public education and 
health and social insurance—enhance the productivity of capitalism and spur economic 
development. In public education, the most productive part of the welfare state, for most of the 
nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the United States was the world leader, but is no longer. 
 Though few would argue that public education is not part of the welfare state, most 
previous cross-national analyses of welfare states have omitted education. Including education as 
part of the welfare state has profound consequences, undergirding the case for the productivity of 
welfare state programs and the explanation for why all rich nations have large welfare states, as 
well as identifying US welfare state leadership. 
 In the first section of the paper, we discuss the definition and boundaries of the welfare 
state and the sources for our data. The second and third sections show that welfare states enrich 
rather than impoverish nations. The fourth shows that the contemporary American welfare state 
is not unusually small and that while the United States lagged in the provision of public relief 
and social insurance throughout most of its history, the United States was a leader in the 
provision of mass public education. The fifth concludes with a brief summary of our analysis of 
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the future of the American welfare state. We say less about public health and health care in order 
to focus on education here. Of course, almost everyone knows that the United States spends 
twice as high a share of GDP on health care than the average of the other nations here, with no 
firm evidence of better outcomes. 
The idea that the United States has always been a laggard in welfare state development is 
not only widespread and misleading, it is pernicious.  Those who mistakenly believe that the 
United States has always been slow to develop social welfare programs are prone to dismiss the 
current lag in early education and child care with the argument that lagging may be a good thing. 
After all, if despite always being behind, the United States is the richest nation on earth, why 
worry about it? But if one of the main reasons why the United States is the world’s richest nation 
is that it has been a world leader in developing mass public education—and if it has now 
relinquished that lead—this is surely a cause for worry. 
I. Definitions 
All wealthy nations, including the United States, are welfare states—that is, they are 
primarily capitalist states with large, selective doses of socialism. What have been socialized are 
institutions that reduce economic insecurity. By its nature, capitalism produces too much 
economic insecurity.  A hallmark objective of welfare state institutions is, therefore, to reduce 
economic insecurity. Education, health, insurance, and cash benefits (social insurance and public 
assistance) all reduce economic insecurity. Education and health increase human capital, making 
citizens more capable of dealing with the economic insecurity produced by nature and by the 
market.  Social and health insurance and public assistance also make citizens more secure by 
reducing the economic costs of insecurity directly. 
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Unlike the transfer of resources in the typical capitalist market economy—an explicit 
trade: “I’ll pay you this for that”—social welfare transfers in the form of education, health, social 
insurance, and cash and in-kind public assistance flow to citizens as a matter of law or 
entitlement and are paid for by other members of the community by law or requirement. Social 
welfare transfers are publicly provided or subsidized goods that provide predominantly private 
benefits. For example, though the public at large benefits from the education of all children, the 
children who get the schooling and their families reap the largest benefits. Our work builds on a 
vast scientific literature in economics, sociology, political science, history, and social work, but 
departs in a few fundamental respects from that of the large majority of welfare state scholars. 
Most important, our measures encompass a broader set of social welfare transfers, including 
education, employer-provided benefits, and all in-kind benefits. 
Education as part and parcel of the welfare state Including public education as a welfare 
state program is—or should be—the least controversial departure from conventional practice, but 
is by far the most consequential. There are two reasons why including education should not be 
controversial. First, even though most scholars doing cross-national comparative welfare state 
analyses omit education empirically, the conceptual definitions of welfare states put forth by the 
leading scholars in the field include education. For example, in perhaps the most influential book 
on the welfare state in the sociology and political science literatures, The Three Worlds of 
Welfare Capitalism (1990), Gosta Esping-Anderson first defines the welfare state as: “… state 
responsibility for securing some basic modicum of welfare for its citizens.”  He goes on to say, 
“What then constitutes salient dimensions of welfare state stratification? … The education 
system is an obvious and much studied instance…. At this point, we confine our attention to the 
welfare state’s traditional and still dominant activity, income maintenance.”  In Poverty in 
4 
Europe and the United States: A World of Difference (2004), Alberto Alesina and Edward 
Glaeser, two of the most influential welfare state scholars in economics, define welfare state 
programs as “the redistributive side of government policies” but include only cash transfers and 
health transfers in their analysis.  
Second, although education is generally missing from most empirical analyses of the 
welfare state, an increasingly large minority of welfare state scholars do include education in 
their inquires. British scholars of the welfare state have a long tradition of including education in 
their analyses (Richard Titmus 1958; John Glennister 1992; John Hills 2004). The authoritative 
collection of classic readings on the welfare state designed for graduate students in economics, 
Economic Theory and the Welfare State (2001), edited by Nicholas Barr and overseen by the 
leading economists in the world, has a large section on education, consistent with its operational 
definition of the welfare state: “For the purposes of these volumes the term `welfare state' is used 
for the state’s activities in three broad areas: income transfers, health and health care, and 
education.”  Finally, welfare state scholars who include education have already taught us a great 
deal.   
For instance, Professor Robert Lampman, first director of the Institute for Research on 
Poverty at the University of Wisconsin, constructed in Social Welfare Spending: Accounting for 
Changes from 1950 to 1978 (1984)  the definition of social welfare transfers that underlies our 
own definition. He also conducted the first benefit-cost analysis of welfare state transfers of 
which we are aware and found that: 1) benefits are at least as great as costs, and 2) most of the 
measured benefits come from education. Arnold Heidenheimer and John Layson (1982) present 
convincing evidence that the historical development of the US and German welfare states 
differed in that Germany led the way in Old Age Pensions and the United States led the way in 
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the development of mass secondary education. Peter Lindert, an economist and historian extends 
the work on the benefits and costs of welfare state institutions in his recent book on welfare state 
development in rich nations, Growing Public (2004), showing that these change over time, and 
enrich (and in some cases create) the comparative histories of public assistance, education, and 
social insurance in rich nations, documenting that welfare state leadership has changed over 
time. 
Finally, including education in the analyses has huge consequences. It sets the stage for 
and undergirds the case that the welfare state as a whole is productive. It also refutes the 
widespread belief that the United States has been a welfare state laggard. This statement is only 
true if we consider cash transfers and public assistance (Garfinkel, Rainwater, and Smeeding 
2010). 
Other social welfare state benefits 
Besides education, our analysis of welfare state spending departs from most previous 
analyses by including employer-provided health insurance and pension benefits and tax 
expenditures. We also include social welfare spending by all levels of government. Tax 
expenditures (savings in income tax payments) and tax-subsidized employer-provided 
expenditures are alternative, less progressive, means of achieving some of the social goals of 
direct government spending—among them, providing health insurance, housing, and income 
security in old age. As such, including them gives a more accurate description of the size of 
welfare states. 
Most economists treat tax expenditures as economically equivalent to explicit budget 
expenditures and would therefore agree that, at a minimum, the tax-subsidized portion of 
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employer-provided health insurance (between one-fifth and one-quarter of the total) should be 
included as welfare state expenditures (Adema and Ladaique 2005). Although a case can be 
made for counting only the tax-subsidized portion on the grounds that state funding differs from 
funding stimulated and regulated by the state, some economists and political scientists—whose 
practice and rationale we follow—argue for including the entire amount of employer 
expenditures on the grounds that these benefits are publicly subsidized and regulated; that 
employer-provided health insurance involves socialization of the risk of ill health and 
redistribution from the healthy to the sick, at the firm rather than the national level; and, that 
failing to include these benefits underestimates the share of the population with insurance and 
mischaracterizes the US welfare state by obscuring and minimizing how much it spends on 
subsidized health insurance.  Moreover, in the Divided Welfare State (2002), Jacob Hacker 
shows the development of employer-provided health insurance was a substitute for and 
forestalled the development of a national health insurance system. Finally, the decentralization of 
insurance payers that results from employer-provided benefits as opposed to a single national 
insurer is the most important factor in accounting for the extraordinarily high cost of the US 
health care system and for its recent reform (Garfinkel, Rainwater, and Smeeding2010). 
By the same logic, at a minimum, the tax-subsidized portion of employer-provided 
pensions should also be included as a welfare state transfer. The case for including all of 
employers’ spending for pensions, however, is weaker than the case for including all of their 
spending for health insurance.  Health insurance, by its nature, redistributes from the healthy to 
the sick. Employer-provided pensions may involve no interpersonal redistribution (other than the 
tax subsidy) if, for example, the pension is a defined-contribution plan that involves private 
accounts and no spousal or survivor benefits. Unfortunately, we cannot distinguish between 
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pensions that do and do not involve interpersonal transfers. For simplicity, we calculate the size 
of welfare states in two ways—by counting both all and no employer-provided benefits as social 
welfare transfers. 
 Social welfare transfers, as noted above, are publicly provided or subsidized goods that 
provide predominantly private benefits. Because academic analysts of the welfare state have 
focused on education, health, housing, social insurance, and public assistance, government 
agencies in both the United States and other countries publish data on social welfare 
expenditures in these domains, and international governmental agencies such as the Organization 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) publish cross-national data that use these 
categories.  We follow this tradition. 
 Some vital parts of modern welfare states, however, do not involve transfers that so 
clearly provide predominantly private benefits.  The most important of these is public health. 
Public health involves both vast public expenditures on clean water and sanitation that are not 
counted as part of the welfare state and a vast body of regulations that protect from disease. 
Sanitation, clean water, inoculations, and other aspects of public health clearly provide large 
private as well as large public benefits. But whether private benefits are bigger than public 
benefits is not clear to us and, to our knowledge, has not been seriously studied. What is clear is 
that expenditures on sanitation and clean water are not counted as social welfare expenditures, 
while public health doctors and facilities, inoculations, and other aspects of the public health 
system are counted. We do not attempt to estimate the full costs of all public health programs, 
but discuss the importance of public health to productivity and economic growth in section 2. 
Here, we note that if all public health expenditures were counted as part of welfare state program 
expenditures, welfare states in rich nations would very likely look even more alike than depicted 
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in section 3. We also suggest that estimating the costs and benefits of public health sanitation 
investments would be a useful contribution to the welfare state literature. 
 Other government regulations, such as minimum wages, rent controls, and child support 
enforcement are also important ingredients of modern welfare states that deserve more analysis. 
For many achieving full employment through the use of Keynesian macroeconomic policies is 
also an essential welfare state objective. But, regulation and macroeconomic policy are beyond 
the scope of this paper.1
II. Welfare states enrich, not impoverish, nations 
 
Three sets of facts suggest welfare state programs enrich rather than impoverish nations. 
First, all modern rich nations have large welfare states.  Second, economic growth rates of 
currently rich nations are larger than they were in the pre-welfare state past. A remarkable 
number of people seem unaware of this second fact due to historical myopia. Third, there is very 
strong evidence that public education and public health have led to enormous gains in 
productivity and economic well-being. The evidence on the effects of social insurance and other 
cash benefits on growth in GDP is weaker, but suggests small positive effects in the early 
development of social insurance and at worst small negative effects currently. Two huge 
positives combined even with a small negative add up to a very big positive. 
All rich nations have large welfare states 
 Figure 1 displays the relationship between a country’s income and the size of its welfare 
state.2 The most common measure of the size of a welfare state is a country’s total social welfare 
transfers as a share of its total annual income, or its gross domestic product (GDP). The size of 
welfare states is displayed from the bottom to top of the diagram; income per person is displayed 
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from left to right.  Both variables are logged. Each of the 162 dots in the figure represents a 
country and describes both the size of its welfare state and its average income per person. The 
poorest countries cluster in the bottom left hand corner of the diagram, while the richest 
countries cluster in the top right hand corner. Clearly, the richer the country, the greater the share 
of their income that citizens devote to welfare state transfers. The same pattern holds within the 
United States and within Europe. The higher the income of states or countries, the greater the 
share of income that they devote to welfare state transfers.3 
The black dots represent the fourteen rich countries analyzed in Wealth and Welfare 
States.  All of these rich nations have large welfare states.4 If the welfare state is a drag on 
nations, as the critics would have us believe, how could it be that all these rich nations have large 
welfare states? One alternative explanation to the productivity of the welfare state is that welfare 
state programs are a luxury good that we buy more of as we get wealthier—a special case of 
Wagner’s law of social spending. Causation surely does run from wealth to welfare state. But, if 
the conservative opponents of the welfare state are correct, large welfare state programs will 
eventually bring rich nations down. So the currently rich nations should not remain rich for long.  
Indeed, the currently rich nations have only had large welfare states for the last 30 years, which 
is a relatively short period of time. 
Growth rates in rich nations are higher now than in the pre-welfare state past 
A longer historical perspective reinforces our conclusion that the effects of the welfare 
state on economic growth have been positive. Table 1 presents growth rates in per capita GDP 
for the fourteen rich nations examined in Wealth and Welfare States for two recent time 
periods—1960 to 1975 and 1975 to 2006, and for one long period before the growth of the 
welfare state—1870 to 1913.  Except for Ireland and the United Kingdom, growth rates are 
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higher in all countries, and much higher in most, from 1960 to 1975 than they are from 1975 to 
2006. The Swedish growth rates drops from 3.11 to 1.67, or, by nearly a half!  This sharp drop in 
growth rates fueled the belief that the welfare state was strangling capitalism. 5 That Norway, 
whose social welfare spending is only a bit lower than Sweden’s, had higher growth rates from 
1975 to 2006 than the United States provides some evidence to the contrary. That Sweden’s 
growth rate from 1994 to 2006 (not shown in table) was back up to 2.5 percent provides further 
evidence to the contrary. 
 The longer historical perspective provided by the data in column three provide evidence 
that the growth rates in the 1960 to 1975 period were unusually high. This earlier period comes 
after the American Civil War and the Franco-Prussian War and before World War I.  Although 
not shown in the table, economic growth before this period and afterwards—during World War I, 
Great Depression, and World War II—was dramatically lower.  A country-by-country 
comparison of columns one, two, and three indicates that economic growth rates in the 1960 to 
1975 period were unusually high. While growth was substantially higher in most countries 
between 1960 and 1975, as compared to post-1975 period, in all countries except the United 
States, growth rates were dramatically higher in the 1960 to 1975 period than they were in 1870 
to 1913. 
 Even more important, most of the currently rich nations have higher growth rates in the 
large welfare state 1975 to 2006 era than they did in the pre-large welfare state 1870 to 1913 era.  
Look first at the United Kingdom, the first nation to industrialize.  It is useful to begin with the 
industrial leader because countries that industrialize later are able to grow faster as they catch up 
by copying the successful technologies of the leader(s). The annual growth rate of the United 
Kingdom during the Victorian era was 0.65 percent, compared to a robust 2 percent per year in 
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the large welfare state era. In Germany, the second leading European nation, growth is also 
higher in the large welfare state era, though the difference is not nearly as great. In only three 
countries—Canada, the United States, and Sweden—are annual growth rates higher in the earlier 
than the later period.  The largest difference is for the United States—nearly one-half percentage 
point.  But, the initial US figure is unusually high for two reasons: catching up from 
incorporating foreign technology and recovering from the Civil War. If we divide the period into 
two sub-periods, growth is 2.95 percent from 1870 to 1890, and only 2.25 percent from 1890 to 
1913, or only slightly higher than the 2.04 percent growth rate from 1975 to 2006.6 Thus results 
are sensitive to the particular years chosen for comparison. But the big picture is clear. Incomes 
in most of the currently rich nations are now growing faster, not slower, than they have in the 
past.  Of course, many other things besides social welfare spending have changed during the past 
150 years. But, as we have seen, welfare state spending is now very large relative to the total 
production of goods and services in all advanced industrialized nations. If such spending had 
large adverse effects, it is doubtful that growth rates would have been so large in the last 30 
years.  The crude historical relationship suggests, at a minimum, no great ill effects and, more 
likely, a positive effect. 
 The burden of proof clearly lies on the side of those who claim that welfare state 
programs are strangling productivity and growth. If they are right, they need to explain why all 
rich nations have large welfare states and why growth rates have grown in most rich nations as 
their welfare states have grown larger. 
Education and public health are very productive  
Education. Markets produce too little education, health care, and insurance because the 
benefits of education, health, and economic security spill over beyond the individual child and 
12 
the child’s family to other members of society. Economists refer to this spillover as an 
externality. Consider education. Each of us has an interest not only in our own children’s 
education, but also in the education of other children as well. Poorly educated children are more 
likely to be unhealthy, dependent on public assistance, and criminal when they become adults. 
Education reduces these social costs of ignorance. More-educated children are also more likely 
as adults to be more informed citizens and more generally capable of a higher level of social and 
economic interaction. Finally, particularly important for nations like the United States, whose 
population includes such a diversity of nationalities, religions, and races, public education 
transmits a common set of social values to children—helping to make them American children. 
Sociologists call this “increasing social cohesion.” In making decisions about how much to 
invest in their own child’s education, parents acting individually do not take account of these 
public benefits. Thus reliance on the market leads to underinvestment in education. Collective 
action is required to reach the optimum level of education. Of course, government financing or 
provision of education, or both, does not guarantee the optimal level of education. Governments 
are no more perfect than markets are. With respect to education, however, we know that the 
private market fails to invest enough. 
The empirical evidence is overwhelming that public education promotes productivity and 
growth.  Economists agree that improvements in education account for a good deal of economic 
growth (Denison 1962; Mankiw et al. 1992; Barro 2001; Lucas 1988). Today the controversy in 
economics is over whether we are spending enough on education, particularly tertiary education 
(Goldin and Katz 2008). Our answer is we are not spending enough on education as the most 
beneficial  public investment . 
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Public health and health insurance. The theoretical case for public health measures 
such as sanitation, inoculation, even isolation, and most generally, the prevention of infectious 
disease is identical in principle to the externality, or spillover, argument for education. As with 
education, the benefits of public health programs are not limited to the individual but extend 
society-wide. And as with ignorance, the disadvantages of poor sanitation extend far beyond the 
individual. Our neighbors’ failure to be sanitary imposes costs not just on them but on us. If each 
of us were to pay only for our own sanitation, we would have too little. If each of us were to 
weigh the individual benefits and costs of purchasing an inoculation, we would get too few 
inoculations and too much disease.  
Scientific evidence also indicates that the public health measures described above have 
large social benefits and, like public education, promote productivity and growth. The huge gains 
in life expectancy between 1890 and 1930—e.g., 14 years in the United Kingdom and 16 years 
in the United States—are due primarily to public health investments in the late nineteenth and 
early twentieth centuries (Samuel Preston 1975, 1980, 1996; Robert W. Fogel 2004; and Cutler, 
Deaton, and Lleras-Muney 2006). The gains in health and life expectancy attributable to public 
health have led in turn to large gains in productivity and economic growth, though unlike the 
case for education, economists have not estimated economic rates of return for massive public 
health investments. 
Since 1950 the greatest gains in life expectancy have been at older ages in most rich 
countries. In the United States, life expectancy at age 65 grew by 5.0 years, largely due to gains 
in cardiovascular disease treatment and health insurance spending on the aged to guarantee heir 
access to these benefits (Cutler 2004). But these investments have come at a high price in both 
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absolute dollars and in terms of opportunity costs. Other countries have done as well in terms of 
life expectancy, but at a lower total outlay (Anderson et al. 2003). 
Social insurance and income maintenance 
The majority of social insurance spending in most welfare states is for the aged 
unemployed and disabled (whom we concentrate on here). But before discussing the evidence for 
whether social insurance promotes or retards economic growth, it is worth noting that social 
insurance enriches us even if it has no effect on economic productivity and growth. 
Unfortunately, quantitative research on the economic worth of reducing insecurity is in its 
infancy.7 Still, economists across the political spectrum agree that social insurance reduces 
economic uncertainty, thereby improving individual utility and economic well-being. Most 
American economists now agree that there is a role for government in assuring that the aged 
have sufficient income in retirement and that government can achieve this end more efficiently 
than private markets and the family alone (Becker and Murphy 1988; Buchanan 1968; Aaron, 
1982; Musgrave and Musgrave, 1984; Blinder, 1988; Steuerle and Bakija, 1994; Feldstein 1987 
and 2005). Only a few ideologues reject any government role. Conservatives who want the 
government to require people to save for their own retirement favor welfare state programs that 
don’t redistribute income. Standard economic analysis suggests three reasons why welfare state 
programs might reduce the productivity of capitalism.  The first and most important source of 
inefficiency is the taxation required to finance welfare state services.  Taxes distort and blunt 
incentives. Benefits may also distort and blunt incentives. Because public assistance benefits are 
sharply reduced as earnings increase, they reduce the incentive to work. Government-guaranteed 
retirement pensions may decrease private saving for retirement. Finally, collecting taxes and 
distributing benefits entail administrative costs.   
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On the other hand, pensions for the aged, the disabled, and survivors promote social and 
political stability. In the late nineteenth century, the Conservative German Chancellor Otto von 
Bismarck pioneered social insurance to undercut the rapidly increasing appeal of the German 
Socialist Party—a revolutionary party at the time—and thereby promote social stability. Social 
and political stability promote productivity and growth. 8 Furthermore, by reducing economic 
insecurity, social insurance and safety nets make people more willing to take economic risks. 
While unemployment insurance prolongs unemployment at the individual level (Feldstein 1976), 
it may be that an unemployed worker who can take the risk of remaining jobless a little longer 
will in the end find a job that is a better match for his or her skills, thus increasing productivity. 
Thus economic theory does not offer a firm prediction of the effects on productivity and growth 
of increasing or decreasing social insurance or, more generally, of the size of the welfare state.  
What is the evidence? Anthony Atkinson (1999) concludes “The results of econometric 
studies of the relationship between social transfer spending and growth rates are mixed: some 
find that high spending on social transfers leads to lower growth, others find the reverse. The 
largest of the estimated effects—in either direction—do not, however, seem believable.” In the 
most recent study, Lindert examines three periods of growth in the OECD welfare states—1880 
to 1930, 1962 to 1981, and 1978 to 1995—and finds a statistically significant positive effect of 
cash transfers on economic growth during the first two periods but none during the third.  These 
findings suggest that early expansions in social insurance increased growth and that the most 
recent expansions have not harmed it.  
III. The American welfare state is not unusually small 
As noted above, the most common measure of the size of a welfare state is a country’s 
total social welfare transfers as a share of total income. Most measures of social welfare 
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transfers, including those presented in Figure 1 in the previous section, exclude employer-
provided benefits. In the international context of all nations, the size of the US welfare state does 
not stick out. All rich nations have large welfare states.  If the comparison is limited to rich 
nations, the US welfare state appears unusually small only if employer-provided benefits are not 
counted. When employer-provided benefits are counted, the United States does not appear 
unusually small. We show this in Figure 2, which depicts the overall size of welfare states as 
measured by social welfare transfers as a share of GDP in fourteen rich nations. The fourteen 
nations are grouped into five predominantly English-speaking nations (Australia, Canada, 
Ireland, the United Kingdom, and the United States), six continental European nations (Belgium, 
France, Germany, the Netherlands, Italy, and Spain), and three Scandinavian or Nordic nations 
(Finland, Norway, and Sweden) (Esping-Anderson 1990; Kamerman and Kahn1978; and 
Wilensky and Lebeaux 1965). 
The first bars, which do not include employer-provided benefits, indicate that each of the 
countries spends a substantial fraction of its GDP on social welfare—from 17 percent to 38 
percent. As a share of total government spending, social benefits are at the very least 55 percent 
of government outlays (in the United States) and at the most 90 percent (in Sweden) (Osberg, 
Smeeding, and Schwabish 2004).  Not counting employer-provided benefits, the English-
speaking nations spend the least—Ireland and the United States, the very least. The European 
nations spend substantially more, and the Scandinavian nations spend the most. These patterns 
are consistent with findings of other comparative studies (Kamerman and Kahn 1978; Smeeding, 
O’Higgins, and Rainwater 1990; Esping-Andersen 1990; Smeeding 2004). 
The second bar, which includes employer-provided benefits, indicates that within the 
English-speaking group, the United States spends nearly as much as the United Kingdom does 
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and more than Canada and Australia do. Including employer-provided health insurance and 
pensions and tax expenditures increases the estimated size of the US welfare state by nearly 50 
percent!  More generally, including employer-provided benefits and tax expenditures 
substantially narrows cross-national differences in the size of welfare states because the English-
speaking nations rely more on them than do most of the continental West European and 
Scandinavian countries. 
Moreover, when the size of a welfare state is measured by the total amount of social 
welfare transfers per person, the US welfare state is not—as it is often described—unusually 
small but, in reality, quite large. Although welfare state spending relative to GDP is a good 
indicator of the degree to which countries differ in the share of their incomes devoted to the 
welfare state, such differences are not a good indication of the absolute amounts of social welfare 
transfers per person in each country. The United States is the richest large nation. Sweden’s GDP 
per capita, for example, is only 79 percent of that of the United States, though Sweden devotes 
more than 41 percent of GDP to welfare state expenditures, compared with the US share of 32 
percent GDP per capita. Consequently, in absolute terms, the United States spends a lot more 
than 32/41 of what Sweden spends on a per capita basis.  Figure 3 presents our estimates of per 
capita social welfare transfers in the same fourteen rich nations with and without including 
employer-provided benefits. For those who believe that the absolute size of the US welfare state 
is small, the data in Figure 3 are shocking and constitute a wake-up call.  Real per capita social 
welfare spending in the United States is larger than that in almost all other countries! Even if 
employer-provided benefits and tax expenditures are excluded, the United States is still the third 
biggest spender on a per capita basis. 
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IV. Laggard in public relief and social insurance, but a leader in the 
provision of mass public education 
Cash relief is the first, public education the second, and social insurance the last welfare 
state program to develop historically. In this part of the paper we go back to 1800 and show that 
though the United States lagged in providing cash relief and social insurance, it led in providing 
mass education.  
Relief for the poor 
The oldest welfare state program is poor relief.  As feudalism gave way to capitalism in 
Western Europe, the state supplanted the feudal lord and the church in bearing responsibility for 
aiding the poor. Capitalism and public poor relief developed together, first in Great Britain and 
the Netherlands. Providing public aid to the poor was a big, hotly contested step, and even 
though the principle of public responsibility became increasingly less controversial, the nature of 
the aid to be provided continues to this day to be a subject of great debate.9 Because the United 
States came into being as colonies of Great Britain, it has provided public relief for the poor 
throughout its history. 
Figure 4 depicts the share of national income (percentage of GDP) spent on public relief 
(what is known colloquially in the United States as welfare) by ten currently rich nations—
Ireland, the United Kingdom, and the United States; Belgium, France, Germany, and 
Netherlands; and Denmark, Norway, and Sweden—from 1800 to the present. Despite some huge 
gaps in the data, this picture clearly depicts several important facts. In all countries, the share of 
national income spent on public relief (measured from bottom to top in the figure) has grown 
over time. The biggest increases in spending occurred during the last 40 years of the twentieth 
century. But still the United States is the laggard in terms of cash and near cash benefits—
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including food stamps and the Earned Income Tax Credit (Rainwater and Smeeding 2004). All 
countries have also experienced big fluctuations in spending over time, some of which are driven 
primarily by unemployment. When unemployment goes up, so does public spending on relief. 
But GDP goes down. The combination of an increase in spending and a decrease in GDP leads to 
spikes in the percentage of GDP devoted to public relief, as exemplified by the Swedish spike in 
the early 1990s. 
Finally, note that the United Kingdom stands out as being the early leader in providing 
public relief for the poor and is above average in spending until at least 1970. Clearly, the United 
States did not inherit its special aversion to cash relief benefits from the mother country. Indeed, 
Smeeding and Waldfogel (2010) show that Britain’s 10-year war on child poverty has largely 
been a success, with well-targeted cash and in-kind subsidies cutting British poverty in half from 
1999 to 2009. 
Public education  
Public education began in some Prussian counties, in the northern United States, and in 
Canada in the first half of the nineteenth century. By the end of the century it had become near 
universal at the elementary level in leading countries. Figure 5 uses data compiled by Lindert to 
display the growth in public school enrollment rates in our fourteen nations for three different 
years during the course of the nineteenth century—1830, 1870, and 1900.  Enrollment rates are 
measured by the number of children enrolled in public elementary schools as a percentage of the 
population aged 5–14.10  For each country and each year, enrollment rates are displayed by bars. 
The longer is the bar, the greater is the enrollment rate. 
 Although data for some years are missing, several clear patterns emerge from Figure 5. 
First, over time, enrollment rates went up in all countries. Although well under half of all 
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students were enrolled in elementary school in most countries in 1830, by the end of the century, 
well over half were in school in most countries, and in the leading countries the share was close 
to 90 percent. 
Second, leadership changed over time.  In 1830, though US enrollment rates were among 
the highest, Germany’s rates were even higher.  But enrollment in Germany grew very little.  By 
1870, the United States and Canada were the leaders and they maintained that leadership 
throughout the rest of the century.  
Third, in education, there is no hint of Esping-Anderson’s three worlds of welfare 
capitalism. The commitment to public education varied enormously within the English-speaking 
countries, with the United Kingdom and Ireland being education laggards and the United States, 
Canada, and Australia being leaders. On the continent, Germany stood out as a clear leader. By 
the end of the nineteenth century, Norway and Sweden were in the middle of the pack and 
Finland was at the bottom. 
 At the beginning of the twentieth century, most American children attended primary 
schools, but few attended secondary or high schools and only a minuscule share attended college. 
This pattern changed dramatically during the first half of the twentieth century as the US 
leadership in mass education widened.  Figure 6 depicts the growth in enrollment rates in 
secondary education between 1900 and 1930.  The enrollment rate—the ratio of the number of 
secondary students to the number of children aged 5–14 in each country—is not ideal for our 
purposes, but it still accurately reflects underlying differences.11 What is striking is that the US 
rate is nearly double that of the next closest country, Germany, and three to six times higher than 
most of the other countries. Similarly, the proportion of children graduating from colleges and 
universities was much higher in the United States than other nations during this period. 
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The wide American lead in secondary and college education persisted past mid-century, 
at least until 1970, but by century’s end was much reduced. The length of the bars in Figure 7 
depicts the share of adults aged 25–34 in each country who have attained the equivalent of US 
high school and college degrees (in panels A and B) for 2 years—1970 and 2000.12 As shown in 
panel A, in 1970 the United States, at 83 percent, had a clear lead in the share of adults who had 
completed high school. Only Germany, at 76 percent, was close. In most countries, less than half 
of adults had the equivalent of a high school degree.  By 2000, the picture had changed 
dramatically.  Except for the United States and Germany, which already had high rates, the share 
in all other countries increased substantially. The three Scandinavian countries and Canada had 
caught up to or surpassed the United States. The other countries were not far behind. 
 Panel B, which depicts the share of each country’s population that has attained at least the 
equivalent of a US college degree (upper tertiary education), tells much the same story.  In 1970, 
the United States together with Canada had a clear lead. By 2000, most of the other countries had 
caught up or nearly so, and Canada and Ireland were notably ahead.  In short, since the 1970s, 
the United States has been losing its big lead in educational attainment and particularly at the 
tertiary level.( se also Figure 9 below)  
                 Figure 8 depicts how the United States fell increasingly behind in early childhood 
education between 1975 and 2002. The data are not perfectly comparable across the 2 years—
ages 3 to 5 for 1975 versus age 4 for 2002—but the picture tells a clear story. In 1975, the United 
States is in the middle of the pack. By 2002, early childhood education is quite common and the 
United States is clearly behind other rich nations in this respect. 
             Finally Figure 9 convincingly shows the trend in postsecondary education completion 
across a number of cohorts and a series set of nations, most of which are part of this study. In all 
22 
but two countries, Germany and the US, the pattern is  shows higher higher educational 
attainment as new cohorts reach the age of completion of postsecondary school. The trends are 
very clear. In the oldest cohort (aged 55–64 in 2008) the United States was the clear leader. And 
for the generation before the oldest, the GI bill put the United States far in the lead.  But the 
United States is leader no more. The United States is now experiencing a flat period of growth in 
attainment of postsecondary degrees while all other nations save Germany (likely due to the 
1989 annexation of the Eastern Lander) are rapidly advancing.. Countries not shown such as 
Japan and Korea are also ahead of the US. Even nations that are not yet at the US level  of 
tertiary school achievement are rapidly advancing while the United States has no meaningful 
trend. Hence the race between technology and education is being lost by education in the United 
States (Autor 2010; Goldin and Katz 2008). 
In sum, the United States went from being one of the world leaders in mass education at 
the beginning of  the twentieth century to being, by mid-century, far and away, the world leader. 
During the last quarter of the twentieth century, however, the other rich nations substantially 
closed or eliminated the gap in high school.  At the same time, other rich nations surged ahead in 
college enrollment and attainment as well as in early childhood education. 
Social insurance 
Social insurance came into being in the late nineteenth century in Germany and gradually 
spread through the rest of the rich world throughout the twentieth century. The United States 
lagged the European nations both in terms of when it enacted these programs and in how much it 
spends on them.  Work injury compensation is the oldest program; national health insurance and 
paid family leave are the newest. Health insurance came into being for the most part after World 
War II. Child or family allowances are also of relatively recent origin—for the most part a near 
23 
mid-twentieth century phenomenon.  Leadership differs depending on the program in question.  
Germany led in work injury compensation, Denmark in old age insurance, France in 
unemployment insurance, Belgium in family allowances, Spain and Netherlands in health 
insurance, and Spain and Sweden in paid family leave. The United States stands out as a laggard 
here.  It was the last nation to adopt worker’s compensation, which is, even now, a state rather 
than a national program in the United States. Not until 1935 did the United States enact old age 
and unemployment insurance. The United States still lacks universal health insurance, work 
sickness insurance, family allowances, and paid family leave programs.13 
Income maintenance programs are sometimes universal (as in child allowances) and other 
times targeted at the poor. Their biggest effect is to limit downward mobility and reduce poverty 
in all rich nations (Kenworthy 2011). The Great Recession that we are now experiencing has 
pushed many people into poverty in the United States, especially the young and unemployed, and 
elsewhere, but in the larger and more generous cash welfare states the increase has been more 
muted, and incomes have dropped less, so poverty has climbed less (Glatzer 2010). 
V. Summary and conclusion 
Myths about welfare states and their effects on economic development abound. In this 
paper, we rebut three central and related myths.  The “socialist” programs that constitute the 
welfare state do not undermine productivity and economic growth. Rather, they complement 
capitalism and enrich nations. The American welfare state is not unusually small. But, it is 
peculiar in its reliance upon the combination of employer-provided benefits and programs for the 
poor—as opposed to universal programs, which in health care has led to the largest, most 
expensive health insurance system in the world. Finally, the United States rather than always 
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being a laggard in welfare state development was a leader for most of its history in the provision 
of mass public education. 
Myths may influence policy. The United States now lags other rich nations in the 
provision of early childhood education and other cash benefits that enhance child security and 
development. And we are losing the education race at the tertiary level. Should Americans worry 
about this? Should other nations, rich and poor, follow the United States? If it were true that 
welfare state programs reduced economic growth and the United States was always a welfare 
state laggard, Americans should not worry and other countries would be wise to imitate us. Alas, 
the evidence suggests Americans should worry, as other nations have wisely imitated and gone 
beyond us in education, at the very least. 
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Notes
                                                 
1 Aside from employer-provided health insurance, pensions, and other benefits, we also do not deal directly with the 
“third sector”—voluntary nonprofit institutions and charities. One common perception is that state provision of the 
social welfare transfers in the United States is less than in Europe because there is greater voluntary provision 
funded by a higher level of charitable giving. There is some truth to this because much of the third sector consists of 
employer-provided benefits and voluntary organizations such as hospitals that are funded by government or 
employer-provided benefits. (See Blackman, Wing, and Pollack 2008.) As we show in chapter 3 of our book, 
counting employer-provided health insurance and pensions does narrow the gap between the United States and other 
rich nations in welfare state transfers as a percentage of national income. But, employer-provided benefits hardly 
constitute “charitable giving.”  Charitable contributions to churches and other nonprofit institutions such as the 
United Way appear to play a much larger role in the United States than in other rich nations, but the amounts 
transferred are quite small compared to the rest of the welfare state. While a comparative/historical study of the third 
sector would be useful, it is beyond the scope of this article. 
2 Social welfare expenditures are the sum of social security, health, and education spending. Expenditure data is 
taken from IMF Government Finance Statistics Yearbooks (1998–2006). The IMF provides social security, health, 
and education expenditures in local currency. Each expenditure is then divided by that country’s GDP for the year of 
expenditure and the quotients are summed. This is the total social welfare expenditures as a percentage of GDP for 
each country. GDP and per-capita GDP are taken from the World Bank World Development Indicators. All data are 
presented as natural logarithms. 
3 Internationally, spending increases a little less than one percent for each one percent increase in income. Amongst 
the 50 American states, for every one percent increase in state income, welfare state spending increases by at least 
one percent, with some studies suggesting that state spending goes up by more than one percent.  In general, public 
spending on health care seems to more responsive to increases in income than other types of social welfare 
spending, particularly cash assistance (Chernick 1998). 
4 The alert and questioning reader will note that there are three countries that are very rich but have decidedly 
smaller welfare states than all the other rich nations.  The exceptional nations—Hong Kong, Singapore, and the 
United Arab Emirates—have not been included in previous research on welfare states in rich nations and we make 
no attempt to analyze or explain their exceptionalism.  We trust that future scholars will deal with this. 
5 See Lindbeck 1994, 1996, and 1997; Freeman et al. 1997.  For alternative views see Korpi 1996; and Agell 1996.  
For the latest exchange, see Lindert 2005, and comment by Bergh 2006, and response by Lindert 2006. 
6 In Canada, which industrialized more slowly than the United States and had no civil war, the growth in the second 
subperiod was higher than the first—2.4 compared to 1.75. 
7 Amy Finkelstein and colleagues have done the pioneering research in this area. Finkelstein and McKnight (2005) 
find that the economic gains are quite large for health insurance for the aged, but Brown and Finkelstein (2007) find 
they are quite small for old age insurance. 
8 In “Transfers, the Social Safety Net, and Economic Growth,” Xavier Sala-I-Martin (1997) develops a theoretical 
economic model in which transfers quell social and political discontent and thereby increase growth.  He also 
reports that in most empirical studies of economic growth, transfers have a positive effect. Alesina, Ozler, Roubini, 
and Swagel (1996) find that political instability substantially retards economic growth.  The empirical evidence on 
the effects of transfers on growth is discussed in the next subsection. 
9 See Lindert (2004) for a discussion of the historical differences.  More contemporary debates are also discussed in 
Lindert and in section 2.   
10 In a few instances, enrollments were available for only the sum of public plus private enrollments.  By the end of 
the century, private enrollments were a small portion of the total in all rich nations.  
11 It would be preferable to have the percentage of children of secondary school age—say aged 14–18—who were 
enrolled in secondary schools, but these data are not available.  Unless there were drastic changes in cohort sizes, 
however, using the 5–14-year-old group will accurately reflect differences in secondary enrollments across countries 
over time.  
12 To measure educational outcomes, we use the share of the population that has completed secondary and tertiary 
education—roughly the equivalent of US high school and college degrees—and is enrolled in preschool education 
programs. We use OECD data that are designed to make completion rates comparable in terms of attainment across 
nations. 
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13 Of course, as we have noted repeatedly, saying the United States lacks a universal health insurance program does 
not mean that most Americans lack health insurance.  As we have seen, the opposite is true.  The overwhelming 
majority of Americans have health insurance. Similarly, the partially refundable income tax credit for children in the 
US tax code would be economically equivalent to a universal child allowance if it were made fully refundable. 
While some large employers and a few states provide some benefits, Americans are much further away from having 
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